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REVIEWS.

The Theory of Prosperity. By SIMON N. PATTEN, PH.D. New York: The Macmillan Co.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd.

DR. PATTEN is always virile, interesting, though at times eccentric, and the book before us is no exception. We are not surprised to find him following his favorite process of reasoning—deduction, but the patience of the reader is taxed more, perhaps, here than in any previous work. Assertions are made and laws are formulated with utmost complacency, yet where are the historical illustrations, the facts from experience on which they must be based to be of value? In the whole volume but five footnotes are given—but four authorities cited. The time for such speculative work in science is past. Truths can be established only on the basis of fact. In this respect Dr. Patten's book seems almost mediæval. Thus we are told that "wants grow more rapidly than productive power. This is an elementary law to which there are no exceptions" (p. 22). Perhaps this is true. It may be due to imitation. Yet Dr. Patten makes no mention of this or any other reason, but leaves us to accept the law on the ground of his authority alone.

The book is by no means free from fallacies. In his discussion of the conservation of the social surplus (p. 141), Dr. Patten makes function, rather than feeling, the mainspring for conscious effort, thus blurring the distinction so carefully drawn by Dr. Ward. Again he makes labor a purely physiological process—expenditure of energy and reproduction of energy—while it really is a psychological process—effort and satisfactions. To him work is normally a pleasurable activity and becomes irksome wholly because of the social stigma attaching to it. Here Dr. Patten makes the element of pleasure which undoubtedly accompanies the first hours of work the only factor in the process.

Throughout the work the method used is that of contrast. From the title itself, through the designations given Parts I and II—"Income as Determined by Existing Conditions: A Study of Effort and Satisfactions," and "Income as Determined by Heredity: A Study of Discontent and its Remedy"—to the last page of the book Dr.

Patten uses this method of antithesis. The subject lends itself readily to this treatment, and the result is a style abounding in short, packed sentences full of well-chosen contrasts and happy distinctions—at times epigrammatic. As for instance: "Misery is not a product of nature; it is man-made" (p. 41); "Rent is a costless income, not a seized income" (p. 133); "Monopoly is bad, but the confusion of ignorance is worse" (p. 74); "The laws of heredity are mental and social; those of the environment are physical and economic" (p. 9). But Dr. Patten does not always escape the danger which lurks in this use of contrast and condensation. Clearness of thought is at times sacrificed to fitness of phrase, and many of the generalizations are too vague or too sweeping.

The thesis of Part I is that economic prosperity depends upon the power of substitution; the thesis of Part II is that social progress depends upon the power and control of impulse. It is the latter half of the book that is of first interest to the sociologist, for it is here that the idea is worked out that impulse, a product of the social surplus, is the dynamic principle in society and produces progress. This is a contribution to the field of sociology. It is only to be regretted that the subject is not developed with more of the acumen and enthusiasm which Dr. Patten used in an oral discussion of the same, which it was the privilege of the reviewer to hear shortly before the book appeared. From the book alone one can scarcely gather that by *impulse* Dr. Patten means the same thing that Tarde expresses by the word *invention*, or so much of it as is due to pure surplus energy resulting from a satisfied state of the primary physical wants and as distinguished from invention as an intellectual process. This part at least, if not all, of Tarde's *invention* has been more correctly designated *innovation* by Dr. Ward. Dr. Patten's idea would have been much clearer had he used this or a similar term in place of *impulse*. But Dr. Patten seems practically to ignore the large movement that Tarde's works have started. As a whole, however, this last contribution of Dr. Patten's is a work of keen analysis; one that will make a definite impression.

The introduction is no mere formal part of the treatise. It is an introduction in the true sense—*necessary*, not merely *preliminary*, to the book itself. Here is discovered the purpose of the work, which is to show that the assumption made by many social reformers, that "so-called social evils are economic in their origin," has no foundation in fact; but that social evils are due rather to non-adjustment to the environment. It is here that Dr. Patten strikes the keynote to his

theory of prosperity in the characteristically keen distinction which he draws between *poverty* and *misery*, the panacea for the one being treated in Part I, and the remedy for the other suggested in Part II. The introduction also contains the author's justification for the division of the book and the definition of the word *income* as used in the sub-titles.

A careful reading of the introduction thus prepares us for what is to follow. Part I is a study of effort and satisfactions, and is treated in three chapters, each of which is outlined by marginal topics and illustrated by diagrams. It is highly technical, crowded with definitions and distinctions, many of them too abstruse or too finely spun to interest the general reader. The economist, however, will follow the discussion eagerly, for Dr. Patten's new point of departure in many cases leads to interesting, if sometimes startling, conclusions.

Dr. Patten's analysis of the social surplus and the origin of values in chap. i is based on his theory of pain-and-pleasure economy. It leads to the very remarkable statement that the only time in life when the sum of values does not exceed costs is when one has decided to make his own "quietus" with "a bare bodkin" or some more up-to-date weapon! The large view sees the result of the economic process to be, not "goods," but vital energy making future production possible and pleasurable. The social surplus, which is defined as the difference between total utility and total costs (p. 19), is thus seen to be an enduring fund disappearing only to reappear in some new form (p. 42). The waste of surplus is reduced by each step in the adaptation of men to external conditions.

In promulgating his own theory of wages Dr. Patten does not hesitate utterly to cast aside the cost theory. His theory might be called the "option theory," for he makes the option of the best worker in each industrial group to withdraw into the next higher group, if his wages are reduced, the factor in setting the standard of wages. "The monopoly power of each group, gained through the options of its strongest members, is the sole determinant of wages, and is the one thing for which laborers should seek. New options can do what no amount of effort in other directions can accomplish" (p. 50). This discussion brings chap. i to a close, and leads up to Dr. Patten's theory of substitution, which is developed in the two following chapters.

The point of view is now shifted from the traditional one of producer to that of consumer. Hence the conclusions are new. According to this new view, substitution is the power determining the regulation of prices. The consumer can control prices by his power

of substitution, says Dr. Patten. If beef goes up, he can use more mutton. But the price of mutton will then go up, unless *more mutton is produced*. Dr. Patten fails to see that his new theory of price movement involves alertness and mobility of *producer* as well as consumer. Yet he has shown that the freedom of the consumer is as important in low prices as the freedom of the producer. Advocates of the old theory of competition among producers as regulating prices, however, probably will not give up all claims to competition as a factor in the operation, as Dr. Patten seems to demand.

His analysis of monopoly rests on the same potent factor of substitution :

If he [the consumer] had a complete power of substitution, that is, if several commodities could supply each want, or if several groups of producers could supply all his wants, there would be no monopoly. If he had no power of substitution, there being only one commodity that could supply each want, each commodity would be an independent monopoly (p. 86).

A new and certainly very broad view of the subject is taken when Dr. Patten declares that "the growth of one monopoly is always at the expense of other monopolies, never at the expense of the public" (p. 92). According to this view, farmers as owners of land are monopolists and the trades union is a monopoly, for he says "the rent of land held by small farmers and the gains of trades unions . . . are not different in kind from those of other monopolies" (p. 94). In fact, every group or class of which "the public" is composed constitutes a monopoly from a certain point of view; hence the living units of a certain monopoly suffer at the growth of some other monopoly, not as members of "the public," but as "monopolists." The distinction seems verbal rather than essential.

In chap. iii a most interesting discussion of the subject of "Investments" is given. Dr. Patten's treatment of labor and capital is also original and suggestive :

The true contrast with capital is labor force, using the latter term in so broad a sense that it will include every natural or human agency making capital productive (p. 120).

Labor force is made up of a number of concrete days' work and of a group of substitutes for labor. Wherever a natural force is utilized as a substitute for labor, or a new utilization of laborers is made not involving an increase in their number, the additions to the productivity of capital made in this way go to the persons controlling these forces. This increased productivity of capital is valued at the price of the labor for which they are sub-

stituted. From this point of view rent is the price of labor substitutes (p. 121).

Dr. Patten reaches the climax of his philosophy of substitution when he says: "An increased power of substitution is the only remedy for an unequal distribution of wealth" (p. 140).

In the discussion of economic freedom with which Part II opens, Dr. Patten applies his philosophy of substitution, making the power of substitution the great factor in freedom, both of production and consumption.

Labor is free where there is a complete power of substitution. It is the doing or not doing, consuming or not consuming, being active or passive at will, being social or not social, that constitutes freedom (p. 152).

In his explanation of how the exploited in a society consent to the exploitation, Dr. Patten has recourse to the theory put forth in *The Development of English Thought*, that environments change rapidly, while codes of morality—that is, customs, traditions, habits, laws, and institutions—persist. Hence, motor reactions developed in one environment continue after the situation is so changed that other forms of activity would be more advantageous (p. 159).

The real source of exploitation lies, not in political causes nor in competition, but in old traditions, habits, and prejudices. Had not antecedent conditions created contentment in bad environments, exploitation would be impossible in better situations (p. 162).

Exploitation, we are told, is, however, merely a necessary stage in social progress, rather than an enduring part of national life. This interpretation of the subject is certainly unique, but will hardly be universally accepted.

The next chapter, "Income as Increased by Adjustment," is perhaps the hardest reading in the book, while it is at the same time the most important to the sociologist in the discussion of the subject of *impulse*. The treatment is psychological and must be followed with the closest attention, or its fine points will escape the reader's notice. Dr. Patten himself tells us, on the fifth page of the chapter, after the word *impulse* has been used several times, that he has heretofore used the word in a way that suggests a variety of meanings, among which a common thought is apparently absent (p. 185). But the confusion is more apparent than real, he continues, and the thread of the argument, with a little care, can be followed. But without doubt more than "a little care" must be used to follow the discussion. Basing his argument on Dr. Ward's philosophy of desire, which he does not seem to

understand wholly, he develops his theory of impulse through contrasting the rôle of the two in society. The following can be gleaned from the discussion :

Activity is prompted either by desires or by impulses (p. 195). The aim of desire is *satisfaction* ; that of impulse, *ends*. Impulse is the psychic feeling accompanying the outgo of energy. Desire is the feeling accompanying the *consumption* of goods (p. 185). (Here it is clear that Dr. Patten confounds desire with its satisfaction.) Surplus energy stimulates impulse. Impulses are the motives that prompt complete adjustment. Thus, according to Dr. Patten, impulse is the progressive principle in human society. His impulse denotes the usual case in which the satisfaction of desire is not immediate, but where prolonged efforts are necessary for the attainment of the end, and it is in these efforts that the progressive principle resides. Through desire and its satisfaction which is immediate, society remains static. Impulse, which causes men to strive upward and onward toward the ideal, is the dynamic agent that transforms the type of the social structure. Desires are the outcome of past conditions and local situations, and as they become prominent they isolate men into the elementary groups out of which society came. Impulses spring from the new situations acquired through surplus energy. They blend the isolating elements, and give prominence to the new and the general toward which society is moving (p. 206). Society thus disintegrates on the side of desire and integrates on that of impulse (p. 206). Hence the only way to make a complex society continue progressive is to instil into all members of all classes the same impulses and ideals. If desire alone were observed in each of these classes of the heterogeneous society, the past, different for each class, would be accentuated and the disrupting forces alone set free. Hence the means of union in a mixed society are similar impulses and ideals tending toward a future common to all. This brings us to Dr. Patten's discussion of the origin and evolution of the group-ideal. The importance which he attaches to the function of the ideal is seen in the following :

The belief in a better-than-self is the binding element on whose ascendancy the continuance of each social group and institution depends (p. 190). Self-repression is group-exaltation ; it makes clubs, unions, clans, parties, and churches, and these in turn pave the way for the feeling of nationality. A simple impulse thus produces great effects. Men with a large social surplus cannot remain normal except through changes that impute to the social type a higher personality than that found in

the self. Society is the better-than-self (p. 194). "Once started the process cannot stop until energy is idealized as God and society is considered the mother of all" (p. 194). Emphasis is laid on the power of the ideal in nationalizing the group, and application is made to our own country. Says Dr. Patten :

Men should reason where they are alike, but where they differ they must have impulses to move them toward some common goal (p. 209).

For individuals and for single classes reasoning may become a guide to action, but it cannot arbitrate between classes (p. 203).

In a heterogeneous group, therefore, reason only tends to tear men asunder, for it accents the past and local environments. Only common ideals of a common future can draw men of different races and classes together. Hence "social harmony lies in what the race has before it and not in that through which its component elements have individually passed" (p. 204). There is no doubt but that, if this point of view were adhered to in political and social action, assimilation of the heterogeneous elements in the group would be much more rapid than at present. The fact that a nation like the United States has no rational basis for unity is again accented in the last chapter. While each class has its own needs, each section its own peculiarities evoking particular desires, and each race its own heredity, the new impulses that prosperity brings are common to all, and from them will come the forces creating national unity (p. 212).

The aim of the concluding chapter is to show that

Freedom consists not merely of political rights, but is dependent upon the possession of economic rights freely recognized and universally granted to each man by his fellow-citizens (p. 215).

An enumeration of these rights which "must be incorporated in the national thought and become as clearly defined as are political rights," is here given. For Dr. Patten tells us that

It is not from a theory of distribution that a solution of present difficulties will come, but from a better formulation of the moral code and from a clearer perception of the common rights that new impulses and ideals evoke (p. 214). The rights are grouped as: (1) public or market rights; (2) social rights; (3) rights of leisure; (4) exceptional rights. Under public or market rights are discussed the right to publicity, the right to security, and the right to co-operate. Under social rights are treated the right to a home, the right to develop or the right of contact with all the elevating forces in a civilization as long as life lasts, the right to wholesome standards, the right to homogeneity of population, and the

right to decision by public opinion. Under the rights of leisure are classed the right to comfort, the right to leisure, the right to recreation, the right to cleanliness, and the right to scenery. As exceptional rights are classed the right to relief and the right of women to income. This whole discussion is most sane and clear, and deserves the attention of every thinker on social subjects.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

Principles of Western Civilization. By BENJAMIN KIDD. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902.

THE main concept of this book is that we are at the present time passing into a stage of social evolution in which the interests of the present will be consciously subordinated to the demands of a greater future. In the historical philosophy of the author, the ancient world is taken as the characteristic age of the ascendancy of the present, as in it all thought and effort were concentrated upon immediate efficiency. The doctrines of early Christianity, on the other hand, heralded the reign of the future, which has, however, not as yet established itself, because the militarism and other absolutistic tendencies of the earlier era have not been completely superseded. The liberalism of the Manchesterian type is described as a particularly marked recrudescence of the reign of the present—a philosophy in which the welfare of existing individuals alone determines the content of the ethical system. A truer liberalism has, however, dawned: one in which free competition, carried on with the greatest intensity, will continue to reign; where truth will be conceived of as the resultant of conflicting forces; and where the interests of the future are to be clearly recognized as the cardinal element in the ethical system, as the sole factor by which the meaning of present existence can be determined.

The author's cause for action is the same as in his earlier work; namely, the narrowness of the ideals of classical liberalism, and the evident impulse of the thinking and working world to conceive ideals of wider reach and deeper meaning. But the solution which is here attempted invites at the outset the criticism that it is altogether too vague, and has not been reduced to that exactness which even an idealistic philosophy demands. The author confuses the universal, the ethical, and the future; and he assumes that whatever transcends the narrow interests of the individual may be classed as belonging to the system of the ascendancy of the future. The assumption that the uni-